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Abstract
This paper estimates the average Australian public sector wage premium. It
includes a detailed critical review of the methods available to address this
issue. The chosen approach is a quasi‐differenced panel data model,
estimated by the Generalised Method of Moments, which has many
advantages over other methods and has not been used before for this topic. I
find a positive average public sector wage premium for both sexes. The best
estimates are 6.7% for men and 10.5% for women. The estimate is statistically
significant for men (p = 0.024) and for women (p < 0.001). No evidence is
found to suggest that the public sector has an equalising effect on the wages
of its workers.
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I Introduction
The public sector accounts for 16% of total employment in Australia (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2007a). This is similar to many other OECD countries (OECD, 2001). Government thus has the
potential for major distributional effects through wage setting policy. Much research has
investigated the public sector wage ‘premium’, motivated primarily by concerns over efficiency as
well as equity. 2 As discussed by Gregory & Borland (1999), wage setting in the public sector may not
necessarily follow private sector principles. The public sector process may be insulated from market
competition. To varying extents, all governments will seek to control employment costs in order to
achieve efficiency goals. But wage policy may also be motivated by equity goals. Public sector
practice may also be motivated by political incentives, and bureaucratic budget‐maximising (or
minimising) incentives, which may be at odds with social welfare goals.
The aim of this paper is to estimate the public sector wage premium. Specifically, it addresses the
question: ‘What would an average public sector employee be paid under private sector wage setting
principles?’ The evaluation problem is to overcome the missing counterfactual, which is the
unobserved private sector wage for public sector employees at a point in time.
The econometric difficulties involved in addressing this question are substantial. The observed
sectoral wage gap may include a constant effect across all employees. It may also stem from sectoral
differences in returns to the characteristics of employees, which include education and experience
as well as unobserved (by the econometrician) skills such as interpersonal skills, intelligence or work
ethic. These effects need to be distinguished from the sectoral differences in the stock of such
characteristics. Selection bias is hence an important issue. A given employee may select one sector
over the other according to the potential returns to their given (observed and unobserved)
characteristics. The employer may also select from the potential pool of employees according to
such characteristics. These issues are described in Section II, whilst reviewing the most common and
the most recent approaches that have been applied, or could be applied, to this topic.
The chosen model is discussed in Section III. It is a panel data model, similar to that used by Lemieux
(1993; 1998) to analyse the effect of unionisation on wages. The parameters of interest are
estimated using the Generalised Method of Moments (GMM) after quasi‐differencing the wage
equation. This approach has many advantages over the other methods reviewed. To the author’s
knowledge, it has not previously been applied to this topic.
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This literature is surveyed by Bender (1998) and Gregory & Borland (1999).
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The data source is the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia (HILDA) panel survey,
which is described in Section IV. Section V presents results, including regression estimates and a
decomposition of the average wage premium. Section VI offers conclusions. The results of alternate
specifications are shown in an Appendix.

II Review of Previous Approaches and Their Limitations
There is a large literature on sectoral wage differences, surveyed by Bender (1998) and Gregory &
Borland (1999). In the last 10‐15 years the focus of such research has shifted from estimates of the
average public sector effect on wages to the effect on the entire wage distribution. However, the
econometric difficulties in such analyses make it difficult to confidently measure even the average
effect, as will be argued below. In order to motivate the methods used in this paper, I first discuss
the methods previously used and their limitations. I then note that these limitations also apply to
the analogous quantile regression methods.

Models of the average wage premium
First consider the following model:

ln( wi ) = a + bS i + βX i + μi

i = (1,...,N)

(1)

Here, wi is the observed hourly earnings of employee i and N is the number of observed employees.
The left hand side is the natural log of wi. The right hand side is linear in sector of employment (S = 1
if sector = public; S = 0 if sector = private) and other observable characteristics (X). In this model, b is
the average public sector premium. The parameters (a, b, β) can be estimated by OLS. In estimating
b, this method holds X constant and thus takes account of differences in observed characteristics
between sectors. In this model, it is assumed that S is exogenous and hence uncorrelated with the
residual. This implies that any sectoral differences in unobserved characteristics of workers do not
affect wages. This model also assumes that returns to observed (and unobserved) characteristics are
equal in the two sectors. It can be argued all of these assumptions may not hold, but these can be
relaxed in other specifications, as will be shown.
The fixed effects (FE) model utilises repeated observations on individuals:

ln( wit ) = a + bS it + βX it + γ t Dt + θ i + μit

i = (1,...,N)
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t = (1,...,T)

(2)

The subscript t denotes the time point of the observation and T is the number of time points, θi is a
time‐invariant individual effect, Dt is a vector of time dummy variables, γt is a vector of coefficients of
Dt, with γ0 = 0. In such a model, b is identified through the variation in wages within people who
move between sectors: ‘movers’. FE thus improves on OLS in two ways. It accounts for differences in
unobserved characteristics of workers between sectors, assuming these do not vary over time. FE is
also more robust to endogeneity of sector choice than OLS. FE allows sector choice to be made on
observables (X) and time‐invariant unobservables (θ). In other words, the expected value of the
error term is zero conditional on X, θ and S at all time points: E(μit|Xit,Sit,θ i) = 0, ∀ t. In comparison,
OLS is only consistent if sector choice occurs only on observables. A remaining limitation of FE is that
it assumes that observable and unobservable characteristics are valued equally in the two sectors. In
practice, a given individual may earn a higher wage in one sector over the other because of a
constant sector effect (b) but also because of differences in returns to characteristics. As an
estimator of the average wage premium, b̂ will be biased if there are differences between sectors in
the returns to observed or unobserved characteristics.
Perhaps the most common method for examining sectoral wage premium is a decomposition
method such as that of Oaxaca (Oaxaca, 1973). The strength of such methods is that they do not
assume common returns to observable between sectors. Separate wage equations are estimated for
each sector. Let the P subscript denote the public sector and R denote the private sector:

ln(wiP ) = β P X i + μiP

(3a)

ln(wiR ) = β R X i + μiR

(3b)

Where β in this case includes the intercept. The mean sectoral (log) wage difference is decomposed
as follows:

ln( wP ) − ln( wR ) = βˆ P X P − βˆ R X R

(4)

Where X P and X R represent the average (observed) characteristics of employees in the public and
private sectors.
Let

Δβˆ = βˆ P − βˆ R

and

ΔX = X P − X R . Substitute into (4) to get

( βˆ R + Δβˆ ) X P − βˆ R X R = βˆ R ( X P − X R ) + Δβˆ X P = βˆ R Δ X + Δβˆ X P
4

(4a)

The first term represents the effect of differences in characteristics between sectors. Specifically it is
the return in the private sector multiplied by the average difference in characteristics between
sectors. The second term is the effect of differences in the returns to observable characteristics
between sectors. In this version of the Oaxaca decomposition, returns to observable characteristics
in the private sector are the ‘benchmark’ against which returns in the public sector are compared.
The returns provided in the public sector are thus contrasted directly with those of the private
market. This is the appropriate comparison for the research question under consideration in this
paper. Other related decomposition approaches are proposed by Reimers (1983) and Neumark
(1988), which are suited to analysing discrimination, but are less relevant here.
Whilst a simple Oaxaca decomposition allows for different returns to observables, the estimates
( β̂ P and β̂ R ) will be biased if sector selection is made on unobservable characteristics that are
correlated with wages (Heckman, 1979). Thus the results of decomposition will also be biased. This
issue is analogous to the endogenteity of S, when estimated in a single wage equation. The Oaxaca
decomposition can be extended with a Heckman‐type sample selection correction. This is the
approach used by Borland et al. (1998), which is the principal attempt to measure the Australian
public sector wage premium, as well as many others internationally.
Whilst the selectivity corrected Oaxaca decomposition is a common approach, there are a number of
issues which make it difficult to apply to the current investigation. The first difficulty is the existence
of plausible exclusion restrictions for the selection model. For identification in a sample selection
correction model to be convincing (i.e. to be identified beyond distributional assumptions arising
from the nonlinearity of the probit selection model), it is necessary to choose variables which are
assumed to be instrumental in the selection process, but do not directly affect the dependent
variable in the substantive model. In Borland et al.’s (1998) model, this variable is age although no
justification is given for this choice. Kanellopoulos (1997) also uses age, citing the expansion of public
sector employment in the 1970s and 1980s. It can be argued that such an expansion of public
employment represents an exogenous shock to labour demand, causing a disproportionate number
of young people to make their careers in the public sector. However, age may also be correlated
with unobserved characteristics which are valued differently in the two sectors (independently of
experience, which is included in the wage equation). For example, Bellante and Link (1981) find that
public sector workers are more risk averse than public sector workers. As noted by Gregory &
Borland (1999) this may reflect a greater reward for risk aversion in the public sector, and hence
greater rewards to risk taking in the private sector. Age is likely correlated with risk aversion (Halek
and Eisenhauer, 2001; Pålsson, 1996). Other exclusion restrictions that have been used are attitudes
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towards unions (since union membership is correlated with public sector status (eg. Bender, 2003;
Heitmeuller, 2006; Melly, 2006). This is a contentious choice since such attitudes are likely to be
endogenous to working in a unionised environment (as acknowledged by Melly). Father’s occupation
has been frequently used (eg. Bender, 2003; Dustmann and van Soest, 1998; Hartog and
Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993; Melly, 2006; Terrell, 1993). This assumes that one’s father’s
employment in the public sector affects the selection decision but not wages. This may be
contentious if one’s father has contacts in their sector of employment which translate to higher pay
(although Melly’s results suggest this is not an important issue for Germany). The assumption is also
violated if intergenerationally transmitted attitudes to the public sector employment are
accompanied by intergenerationally transmitted (unobserved) skills. To put this in another way, if
one lives with a public sector worker during childhood, they may acquire some skills or knowledge
which are valued in public sector labour markets (and similarly for the private sector). Some studies
(Hartog and Oosterbeek, 1993; Hou, 1993) use parent’s education, which is also likely to be
correlated with unobserved skills. If multiple instruments are available, overidentification tests can
be used to support or reject the assumptions underlying exclusion restrictions. However, their
results are contingent on statistical power.
Another limitation of the selectivity‐corrected decomposition approach is that it cannot decompose
the effect of differences in the stock of unobserved characteristics from the effect of differences in
their returns. In the selectivity corrected decomposition, the equality shown in equations (4) and
(4a) does not hold. The decomposition has additional terms, which are the effects of sample
selection in the wage equations:

ln( wP ) − ln( wR ) = βˆ R Δ X + Δβˆ X P + (θˆP λ P − θˆR λR )

(5)

where λ is the estimated mean Inverse Mills Ratio in the models for each sector, and θˆ is the
estimated coefficient of λ in the selectivity corrected wage equation in each sector. The selectivity
correction terms capture both the effects of differences in unobserved skills and returns to those
unobserved skills. In general, it is impossible to decompose these two effects. This is discussed in
detail by Gyourku and Tracy (1988) and more recently by Neuman and Oaxaca (2004) in a different
context. One approach is to take the selectivity correction terms to the left hand side of (5) and
thereby decompose the selectivity corrected wage difference: ln( wP ) − ln( wR ) − (θˆP λ P − θˆR λ R ) .
The resulting decomposition recovers the ‘unconditional’ wage differential between sectors

( Δβˆ X P ) . This approach corresponds to the following thought experiment. Take a person from the
population of all employees who has the same observed characteristics as the average public sector
6

worker. What is the expected difference between sectors in the wages that person could earn? In
contrast, analysis of the ‘conditional’ wage differential addresses the following thought experiment.
Take a person at random from the public sector and put them in the private sector. What is the
expected change in their wage? This is the relevant thought experiment for the question in this
paper. The selectivity corrected decomposition does not recover this estimate, unless one assumes
that there are no differences in returns to unobservable characteristics between sectors.
A third complication for the selectivity corrected approach is that sector selection derives from both
the supply and demand sides of the labour market. Workers who have the most to gain from public
sector employment are most likely to prefer the public sector. However, public sector employers will
choose the most appropriate workers from the pool of applicants. A single sample selection
correction may not adequately account for the complexity. A more appropriate model is a two‐stage
nested selection model, where the employees choice of applying for public sector work is modelled
first, and the employer’s choice of choosing from applicants is modelled next (see Farber, 1983; and
Lemieux, 1993 in relation to selection and unionisation). This could be implemented as part of a
selection correction model. But it would require a further exclusion restriction which influences
employers’ selection of workers, but not the worker’s productivity in that sector.

Models of the distribution of the public sector wage premium
All the methods discussed so far estimate the average sectoral wage premium. However, much of
the recent literature is focussed on the effect at all points of the wage distribution, mainly through
quantile regression approaches. All of the methods discussed above now have analogous methods in
the quantile regression framework. Quantile regressions are able to estimate the effect of a
covariate at any quantile of the conditional distribution of the dependent variable (Koenker and
Bassett Jr, 1978). Briefly, the quantile regression method is to minimise the weighted sum of
absolute differences (rather than the sum of squares) between the data points and the regression
line. The choice of weight determines the quantile being considered. Thus one could estimate the
effect of working in the public sector (P) on the entire distribution of wages using a series of quantile
regressions. This section serves to briefly highlight that the limitations of the methods discussed
above also apply to the quantile regression models. These methods are discussed in turn below.
The model in equation (1), which allows sector to enter as a constant term, can be estimated by
quantile regression at any point of the conditional wage distribution.
Fixed Effects models are not possible in quantile regression. In a paper that is yet to be published,
Abrevaya and Dahl (2006) propose a panel data quantile regression model, which is analogous to the
7

correlated random effects model for least squares proposed by Chamberlain (1982). In this model,
the fixed effect is modelled as a linear projection of observable characteristics in each period. This
model can be interpreted in a similar way to FE models, in that the effect of sector on wages is
identified by movers between sectors. It has the same major limitation as the FE model, as it
assumes equal returns to observed and unobserved characteristics in the two sectors.
Decomposition approaches also have quantile regression equivalents, as proposed by Machado and
Mata (2005). This was adapted by Melly (2005) and applied to estimate the public sector wage
premium in Germany. This approach was also used by Cai and Liu (2007) to examine the Australian
union wage premium. Melly (2006) has also made an attempt to incorporate sample selection
correction into a quantile regression decomposition. However, the method is complex and is yet to
be published.

III The Model
The approach adopted in this paper is based on that used by Lemieux (1993; 1998) to estimate the
effect of unions on wages. This is a quasi‐differenced panel data model, originally proposed by
Chamberlain (1982) 3 . It combines the strengths of FE (allowing for differences in unobserved
characteristics and allowing sector selection to be correlated with time‐invariant unobservables)
with that of Oaxaca decomposition (allowing for differences in returns between sectors). Unlike all
the other approaches considered, it also identifies the effect of differences in returns to unobserved
characteristics, distinguishing this from the effect of differences in their stock. The method is
described below, drawing heavily on Lemieux (1998).
Assume that employees derive utility from consumption and leisure. Assume further that employees
can choose their quantity of working hours in a given job. It follows from these assumptions that
employees will choose a job with the highest hourly earnings of all available options. The set of
available options depends on their skills. Their skills consist of the quantity and quality of experience
and education as well as other factors such as intelligence, interpersonal skills and so on. A particular
skill set may be more valuable in some jobs than in others.
Begin with expressions for the expected log wage for person i in each sector, denoted yitR and yitP
in (6a) and (6b). Each equation includes observed skills (X) and sector specific returns (β) to those
characteristics. Each equation contains two time invariant unobserved components: θ and ξ. The
3

See also Gibbons et al. (2005) for an application of this approach in the context of industry wage models.
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first of these (θ) represents comparative advantage, those unobserved skills which are valued
differently between sectors, while ψ represents the extent to which those returns differ. The second
(ξ) represents absolute advantage, or those unobserved skills which are equally valued in both
sectors. 4 Observations are taken at more than one period (t):

yitR = δ tR + β R X it + θ i + ξ i

(6a)

yitP = δ tP + β P X it + ψθ i + ξ i

(6b)

These two expressions can be combined into a single wage equation by substituting into the
following:

ln wit = Pit yitP + (1 − Pit ) yitR + ε it′
where P = 1 if the employee is in the public sector and zero otherwise. ε’ is an idiosyncratic error
term. The resulting expression can be written as:

ln wit = δ tR + Pit δ + X it [ β R + Pit ( β P − β R )] + [1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]θ i + ε it

(7)

where δ = δ tP − δ tR and ε it = ξ i + ε it′
Under the assumptions outlined above, there is no explicit role for job characteristics (other than
sector) in the model. Since utility is not derived from the job itself, the characteristics of the job do
not have an independent effect on wages. Recall that an employee chooses a job with the highest
hourly earnings. For that individual, the set of jobs available is a function of their skill set. Thus job
characteristics (including industry and occupation) are a consequence of a person’s skills, rather a
separate effect in the wage equation. This does not imply that returns to say, a university degree,
are equal across occupations and industries. It merely states that a given person will choose the job
which maximises the returns to their own particular skill set.
I also do not control for size of employer or union status. The public sector is a highly unionised
workforce characterised by large employers. Both of these factors are associated with higher hourly
earnings (Miller and Mulvey, 1996; Wooden, 2001). I treat these as inherent features of the public
sector which I do not wish to abstract from. Wooden (2001) has shown that in the Australian labour
market, characterised by enterprise bargaining, the effect of unions on wages operates at the level
4

ξ is orthogonal to θ by construction and is inconsequential for much of what follows. See Lemieux (1998) for

more detail on this specification of time invariant effects.
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of the workplace rather than the individual. Thus workers in highly unionised workplaces enjoy a
wage premium, regardless of their personal union membership. Since HILDA does not include such
data on the workplace, any attempt to explicitly account for the effect of unionisation is likely to be
misleading.

Decomposition of the Average Sectoral Wage Gap
If estimable, the parameters in (7) can be used in a decomposition which distinguishes between the
effects of differences in observed and unobserved characteristics as well as the effects of differences
in returns to both observed and unobserved characteristics. Consider the mean wage difference
between sectors:

ln( wP ) − ln( wR ) = (δ tP + β P X P + ψ θ P + ξ P ) − (δ tR + β R X R + θ R + ξ R )

= δ + β P X P − β R X R + ψθ P − θ R
= [δ + X P ( β P − β R ) + (ψ − 1)θ R ] + [( X P − X R ) β R + (θ P − θ R )]
The contents of the first square brackets represent the effects of differences in wage setting policies,
which includes a constant difference ( δ ) and differences in returns to characteristics. The second
term represents the effects of differences in characteristics.

Estimation 5
The first step to estimating (7) is to ‘quasi‐difference’. That is, to substitute θ for the expression
obtained when θ is made the subject of the argument in a first lag as follows:

θ i = [ln wit −1 − (δ tR−1 + Pit −1δ + X it −1[ β R + Pit −1 ( β P − β R )] + ε it −1 ] /[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

(8)

Substituting into (7):

ln wit = Ft ( X it , Pit ) +

[1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
× [ln wit −1 − Ft −1 ( X it −1 , Pit −1 )] + eit
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

where:

eit = ε it −

5

[1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
ε it −1
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

Analysis was conducted using SAS V9 and Stata V9.2
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(9)

and

Ft ( X it , Pit ) = δ tR + Pit δ + X it [ β R + Pit ( β P − β R )]
Equation (9) is nonlinear and includes an endogenous regressor: ln wit −1 , which is correlated with

ε it −1 and hence with eit . The endogenous ln wit −1 can be instrumented by ln wit −2 , which is
available for this study. I also use the interactions of ln wit −2 with X it −1 , X it , Pit −2 , Pit −1 and Pit as
well as the interactions of the sector history variables: Pit , Pit −1 and Pit Pit −1 with X it −1 and X it as
further instruments. Equation (9) can be estimated consistently using the method of Nonlinear
Instrumental Variables (NLIV) (Amemiya, 1974). 6 NLIV can be motivated by first‐order moment
conditions. Let Zi denote the set of instrumental variables (including X and P). The first order
population moment condition is E(eitZi) = 0. Consistent estimates of the structural parameters (α) are
obtained by choosing those α which minimise the following objective function:

e(α )′Z ( Z ′Z ) −1 Z ′e(α )
Where e(α) = (eit,...,eMt), M is the number of people in the sample, and Z = (Z1’:...: ZM’)’.
Whilst NLIV is a consistent estimator, an efficient GMM estimator minimises the following objective
function:

e(α )′ZWZ ′e(α )

6

Note that whilst e is a function of P, the two are uncorrelated. To demonstrate this, consider:

⎛ P [1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
⎞
⎛ P [1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
⎞
E ( Pit eit ) = E ( Pit ε it ) − E ⎜⎜ it
ε it −1 ⎟⎟ = E ⎜⎜ it
ε it −1 ⎟⎟
⎝ [1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]
⎠
⎝ [1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]
⎠
The expression

Pit [1 + Pit (ψ − 1)]
[1 + Pit −1 (ψ − 1)]

= 0, when Pit = 0

= 1, when Pit = 1 and Pit −1 = 1
= ψ, when Pit = 1 and Pit −1 = 0

⎛ P [1 + P (ψ − 1)]

it
In all cases, E ⎜⎜ it
+
[
1
P
it −1 (ψ − 1)]
⎝

⎞

ε it −1 ⎟⎟ = 0
⎠

and hence E ( Pit eit ) = 0 . Similarly for E ( Pit −1eit ) .
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where the weighting matrix W is the inverse of the estimated variance matrix of the moment
functions, estimated by NLIV (see Davidson and MacKinnon, 1993; Greene, 2003; Hansen, 1982).
In order to separately identify δ tR , δ tR−1 and δ , it is necessary to impose a further restriction on the
parameters. The expected value of θ across all people and both years is constrained to be zero:

⎛ 1 ⎞
⎟∑ (θˆit + θˆit −1 ) = 0
2
N
⎝
⎠ i

θ =⎜

where N is the number of people and

θˆis = {ln wis − (δ sR + Pisδ + X is [ β R + Pis ( β P − β R )]} /[1 + Pis (ψ − 1)] for s ∈ (t , t − 1)

(8b)

Note that whilst θ is a consistent estimate of the mean value of θ, the distribution of θˆis may be
dissimilar to the distribution θ is (see Lemieux, 1993). This is because θˆis in (8b) is partly a function
of ε is as can be seen in (8) for s = t‐1.

Identification
The estimates of δ and ψ are identified only by movers between sectors. This can be seen by noting
that both disappear from (9) when Pit = Pit −1 . Thus reasonable estimates of δ and ψ can only be
obtained with a data set that has a sufficiently large number of movers.
Similarly, the coefficients of X in each sector (βP and βR) are only independently identified by people
whose X changes between t‐1 and t (‘changers’). The main observed characteristics of interest are
the standard human capital variables: experience and education. To separately identify sectoral
differences in returns to education, it is necessary for the data to contain individuals (in each sector)
whose educational attainment changed between observations. In the case of experience, the main
issue for identification is the ability to distinguish it’s effect from that of pure wage inflation or other
changes between observations that affect all workers (as measured by δ tR − δ tR−1 ). The returns to
experience can thus identified by the set of people whose experience increased by less than the time
elapsed between observations.
If the number of ‘changers’ is insufficient, an alternate identification strategy is available. Education
can be treated as time invariant if changers are excluded from the analysis. Education can thus be
incorporated as a component of θ, and differences in returns to education can be incorporated in ψ.
This highlights the key difference between this model and standard panel data models. In a FE
12

model, leaving education in θ implies an assumption of no sectoral differences in returns to
education. This is not the case here. The disadvantage of this strategy is that sectoral differences in
returns to education are not separately identified from differences in returns to other time invariant
skills. This is not a major limitation, as all of the components of the decomposition are consistently
identified. Thus differences in time invariant skills (including education) are identified by movers
between sectors.
A similar strategy is available to incorporate the effects of experience. One can assume that
experience increased by a constant amount between time t‐1 and t. Since the model relies on a
three period balanced panel of employees, this constant is equal to the time elapsed between t‐1
and t. Experience at time t can be incorporated into θ , similarly to the treatment of education. The
effect of a one period increase in experience is incorporated into δ tR − δ tR−1 .
This alternate identification strategy is implicit in Lemieux (1998). Lemieux did not observe changes
in experience or education. This is also the approach applied in this paper. As will be discussed
below, HILDA does observe employees whose educational attainment changes between
observations, but their numbers are insufficient.
An assumption shared by this approach and Lemieux’s is that sector choice is uncorrelated with e,
conditional on X and θ. This does not allow for the possibility that people change sectors due to
shocks in person and sector specific productivity shocks (i.e. temporary comparative advantage).
Lemieux argues that this possibility is reduced by considering only involuntary job changers. These
were people who changed jobs due to ‘plant closing, family responsibilities, illness, geographic
moves, dismissal, or other forms of layoffs’. This does not seem to be a convincing argument for a
number of reasons. Firstly, people may be dismissed or laid off precisely due to a fall in sector‐
specific productivity (especially if institutional constraints prevent a wage reduction). Secondly, even
if an involuntary job loss is assumed to be exogenous, there is no reason to believe that subsequent
sector choice in the next job is similarly exogenous. Rather than following Lemieux’s approach, I
accept as a limitation the assumption that sector choice is uncorrelated with e, conditional on X and

θ. Furthermore, the number of sector changers who changed jobs involuntarily is too small in HILDA
to adopt this approach. For example, such an approach would restrict the number of sector movers
to 6 males and 13 females in the main model (estimated on Waves 4, 5 and 6).

Factors Not Accounted For in the Model
Some factors that may affect sectoral wage differences have not been incorporated in the model. In
particular, earnings are an incomplete measure of the total return to labour. Employees may be
13

willing to accept lower earnings in exchange for other benefits. Superannuation and paid maternity
leave entitlements may be particularly important considerations.
Employer contributions to superannuation are a major component of total remuneration. Under the
Superannuation Guarantee, employers have been required to contribute to each employee’s
superannuation at a rate equal to at least 9% of earnings since 2002. Historically, superannuation in
the public sector has been generous. The Commonwealth Superannuation Scheme commenced in
1922, providing retirees with a defined benefit pension equal to up to 70% of their final salary,
indexed to inflation (Department of Finance and Administration, 2001). Subsequent reforms have
resulted in less generous pensions. If superannuation schemes remain more generous in the public
sector, this may have a downward effect on public sector earnings through a compensating wage
differential. However, sectoral comparisons of employer contributions are hampered by differences
in the benefit structures of superannuation schemes. Schemes fall into three main structures:
accumulation, defined benefits and a hybrid of the two. In accumulation funds, employers
contribute superannuation continuously, in proportion to earnings. In defined benefit funds, the
value of employer contributions is sometimes unknown until retirement because the benefits are
often defined in relation to employees’ final salary. For this reason, the major recent survey of
superannuation in Australia, the Survey of Employment Arrangements and Superannuation (SEAS),
only provides a measure of employer contributions for those who have active accumulation funds
(and no defined benefit or hybrid accounts) (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2001). This excludes 63%
of public sector employee respondents and 15% of those in the private sector. For the remaining
sample, average employer contributions are similar in the two sectors (6.6% in the public sector and
6.8% in the private sector). 7 This is unlikely to be a good indication of the overall generosity of
employer contributions in the public sector. It does suggest, however, that few private sector
employees receive more than the minimum legislated contribution from their employer.
In Australia, paid maternity leave is not mandatory. Public sector employers are much more likely to
provide paid maternity leave than private sector employers. In 2005, the Australian Bureau of

7

Author’s calculations from the SEAS Expanded Confidentialised Unit Record File. The percentage contribution

was calculated by the author for each employee as total employer contributions divided by usual weekly
income from main job. The sample was restricted to employees. Employees of own business were excluded.
People with more than one job were excluded as the employer contribution variable does not differentiate
between jobs. At the time of the survey, the minimum legislated employer contribution was 8%. Employees
with monthly income below $450 per month are exempt, as are those under 18 years of age working less than
30 hours per week. Thus it is reasonable for the average contribution to be less than 8%.
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Statistics surveyed women who had a child under two years of age. Of those who were public sector
employees whilst pregnant, 76% accessed paid maternity leave, compared to 27% in the private
sector (Australian Bureau of Statistics, 2007b: 135). Paid maternity leave may have a downward
effect on public sector wages for females to the extent that they are willing to sacrifice some
earnings in order to access this benefit.
Other sectoral differences that have not been accounted may include job security and flexibility and
possible differences in the utility derived from the work itself.

IV Data
The data used for this study are from the Household Income and Labour Dynamics in Australia
(HILDA) Survey. HILDA is a nationally representative household‐based panel survey, with annual
observations taken since 2001. At the time of writing, the first six waves are available for analysis
(2001‐2006) and government funding has been committed for at least a further six waves.
The model described in the previous section requires a balanced panel with three observations per
person and is identified by changes in X and P between the last two observations. One approach is to
use Waves 4, 5 and 6 (W456), the most recent waves. Recall the notation in the previous sections
referring to time periods t, t‐1 and t‐2. Time period t thus refers to Wave 6 of HIDLA, t‐1 refers to
Wave 5 and t‐2 refers to Wave 4. The main parameters of this model are identified by sector movers
between Waves 5 and 6.
In order to improve the precision of the estimates, I supplement this approach with three pairs of
corresponding models for Waves 3, 4 and 5 (W345), for Waves 2, 3 and 4 (W234), and for Waves 1, 2
and 3 (W123), respectively, which are identified by a different set of movements between sectors.
The results of the W456 model are shown in detail in this section. The key results of the other
models are also discussed in this section and are shown in detail in the Appendix. The four sets of
estimates are treated as equally valid, and are combined to form one overall estimate for each sex,
discussed at the end of the results section.
The dependent variable is the log of hourly earnings. Hourly earnings are derived as ‘current weekly
gross wage and salary in main job’ divided by ‘hours per week usually worked in main job’. Sector of
main job was self‐reported and includes ‘Government business enterprise or commercial statutory
authority’ and ‘Other governmental organisation’.
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The only other observed characteristic included in the model (X) is a dummy variable for casual
employment contracts. This is included because the wages of ‘casual’ employees usually include a
loading that compensates for a lack of entitlements received under other contracts. The size of such
loadings, however, varies considerably, depending on the Award or enterprise agreement under
which an employee is covered. Watson (2005) notes a variation of 15% to 33.3% amongst enterprise
bargaining agreement in the ACIRRT ADAM database between 1994‐2002. The loading is also
between 15% and 33% in most Awards, but is sometimes less than this and can be as high as 50%
(Owens, 2001). Furthermore, many self‐identified casuals do not receive any loading at all (Wooden
and Warren, 2003). A manual adjustment to the wages of casual workers is considered infeasible,
since it is unclear how large such an adjustment would need to be. Thus the size of the loading is
estimated by the model. Secondly, it is possible that average casual loadings are different between
the two sectors. In the main set of estimates, however, the loading is constrained to be equal in the
two sectors, because of a small number of observations which would identify this parameter for the
public sector. The main results are not sensitive to the relaxation of this assumption, as will be
shown.
Observations are weighted by the cross sectional probability weight provided on the Wave 6
responding persons file.
The sample is defined as the set of responding persons who were employees (excluding those
employed by their own business) at all three observations, who changed employers between the last
two observations and who had non‐missing values for the variables included in the model. 8 Separate
models are estimated for men and for women. The final sample for the W456 model consists of 346
men and 282 women. Table 1 details the exclusions from the final sample. The requirement for a
balanced panel of job changers accounts for the majority of exclusions. The sample size is similar for
the W345, W234 and W123 models.
8

Sector of employment is self reported in HILDA. It is possible that some apparent sector movers actually

result from reporting errors in this variable. To address this issue, the sample is limited to those who reported
a change in employer between the last two observations, which follows Lemiuex’s (1998) approach in
principle. In preliminary analysis, it was found that more than half of apparent sector movers did not report a
change in employer in this same period. This suggests that a large proportion of sector movers may be
misclassified. There are, however, a number of other possible explanations. It may result from reporting errors
in the change in employer variable, since this relies on retrospective recall. It is also possible for employees to
change sector without changing employer. This is the case when a public corporation is privatised. In any case,
the conservative approach is taken here, by limiting the sample to employees who reported a change in
employer.
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Table 1 Sample selection in W456 model
Sample of employees in Wave 6 with nonzero weight
with missing Wave 6 data
Employees in Wave 6 without missing data
not in sample of Wave 5 employees
not a job changer between Waves 5 and 6
missing Wave 5 data
Employee job changers between Waves 5 & 6, no missing data
not in sample of Wave 4 employees
missing Wave 4 data
Education changed between Waves 5 & 6
Final sample

Men
3430
81
3349
574
2300
11
464
92
10
16
346

Women
3496
118
3378
677
2251
14
436
119
11
24
282

Notes: This table outlines the exclusions of records from the model estimated on Waves 4, 5 and 6 of the
HILDA data

The sector movers (between Waves 5 & 6) consist of 33 men and 53 women. 9 These people identify

δ and ψ. Returns to experience cannot be separately identified. Each member of the sample was
employed in three consecutive Waves. Their increase in experience between the last two
observations are in most cases equal to the passage of time, or very close to it. Similarly, the number
of people whose highest educational attainment changed between Waves 5 and 6 is too small to
identify the education effect. For example, only 2 females would identify the parameters which
measure returns to education in the public sector. Thus experience and education are included in θ,
and their effects are identified by sector movers, as discussed in the previous section. Any people
whose highest educational qualification changed between Waves 5 and 6 were excluded to ensure
that education is time invariant. Experience was assumed to increase by one year for all, also as
discussed in the previous section.
Casual status changed between Waves 5 and 6 for 90 men and 85 women. These records identify the
estimated casual loading, assumed to be equal in both sectors.
Table 2 shows weighted means for this sample in 2006 by sex and sector. This table shows that the
raw public‐private difference in mean log wages is 0.17 for men and 0.24 for women. 10 Public sector
9

In the W345 models, sector movers consist of 37 men and 47 women. In the W234 model, sector movers

consist of 23 men and 50 women. In the W123 model, the sector movers consist of 35 men and 52 women.
10

The corresponding raw difference in the W345 sample is ‐0.05 for men and 0.06 for women. In the W234

sample it is 0.16 for men and 0.21 for women. In the W123 sample it is 0.12 and 0.20. This variation reflects
the relatively small samples.
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employees are much more likely to hold a degree or higher qualification. They also have slightly
more experience on average. Private sector employees are more likely to be employed in casual
jobs.

Table 2 Sample means (2006)*
Variable
ln wage
Experience (years)
Education
University
degree
Trade
Year 12
less than Year 12
Casual

Men
Women
Public
Private
Public
Private
3.26
3.09
3.13
2.89
15.88
14.48
15.82
14.98

0.54
0.27
0.12
0.06
0.07

0.21
0.36
0.26
0.17
0.27

0.58
0.09
0.15
0.18
0.21

0.22
0.27
0.26
0.25
0.31

* The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the text.

Table 3 shows the results of OLS regressions using the sample described above at Wave 6. It suggests
that for both sexes, the public sector wage premium is positive, but not significantly different from
zero. The return to experience is about 1.7% per year for men and 0.5% for women. The return to
university education is estimated to be large for both sexes. The estimated effect of a casual
contract is negative for both sexes, despite the loading that compensates a lack of entitlements. This
suggests that casual status is correlated with unobserved characteristics that are associated with
lower wages.
Table 4 shows the results of fixed effects regressions using observations at 2006 and 2005 for the
sample described above. For the same reasons discussed above for the main model, education and
experience are excluded as regressors. The estimated public sector premium is similar for both sexes
to the OLS estimates for both sexes. This suggests that for this sample at least, time invariant
unobserved characteristics of employees do not lead to a major bias in the OLS estimates. The
estimated public sector premium is not statistically significant for either sex. The effect of casual
status is positive, as expected, as opposed to the OLS estimates and is statistically significant. This
confirms that casual status is correlated with unobserved characteristics that are associated with
lower wages.
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Table 3 Results of OLS Regressions (2006)*

Public
Experience
Education
degree
trade
year 12
Casual
constant
R squared

Men
coefficient
0.016
0.017
0.447
0.170
0.071
‐0.017
2.686
0.305

SE
0.070
0.002
0.075
0.065
0.071
0.058
0.072

Women
coefficient
SE
0.080 0.058
0.005 0.003
0.431
‐0.043
0.054
‐0.037
2.726
0.263

0.065
0.072
0.064
0.051
0.063

* The dependent variable is the log wage. The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the
text.

Table 4 Results of Fixed Effects (2006 and 2005) Regressions

Public
Casual
Wave 6 dummy

Men
coefficient
0.014
0.090
0.098

SE
0.053
0.043
0.022

Women
coefficient
SE
0.112 0.059
0.012 0.055
0.089 0.027

* The dependent variable is the log wage. The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the
text.

V Results
The parameters of the wage equation estimated using GMM on Waves 4, 5 and 6 are shown in Table
5. Corresponding results are shown for the other three specifications in the Appendix. The constant
effect ( δ ) of public sector employment on wages is estimated to be close to zero for males and a
statistically significant positive (0.145) for women. These parameters are estimated to be positive in
all the other models and they are statistically significant in several (see Appendix). Thus there is
evidence to suggest that the public sector pays a constant wage premium to its workers,
independently of skills.
Overall, there is little or no evidence to suggest sectoral differences in returns to skills. A value of ψ
that is less than 1 suggests that returns to skills are smaller in the public sector than the private
sector. In the W456 model for females, ψ is estimated to be 0.70, and is significantly different from
1. However, this parameter is not significantly different from 1 in any of the other seven models
across both sexes. Further, ψ is estimated to be greater than 1 in three of the eight models (see
Appendix). For men, ψ is estimated to be close to 1 in the GMM model for males (0.95). If ψ is
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restricted to equal 1, the model simplifies to the fixed effects model, the results of which are
reported above in Table 4. Thus it is not surprising that the GMM estimate of δ is small, similarly to
the ‘Public’ coefficient in the fixed effects model. The standard errors are also similar in the two
models. This demonstrates that there is little efficiency loss due to the instrumental variable
approach.
The W456 models suggest a positive loading for casual work for both genders, and it is significantly
different from zero for men. The estimates in the other specifications are also positive, ranging from
0.03 to 0.17. As discussed above, the estimated casual loadings are constrained to be equal across
sectors, but there is little change in the main results if this is relaxed, as will be shown subsequently.

Table 5 GMM regression estimates of wage equations (Waves 4, 5 & 6)
Men
coefficient

SE

Women
coefficient

SE

constant effect ( δ )

0.005

0.052

0.145

0.038

Returns to time invariant skills in public sector (ψ)
Casual

0.952
0.125

0.185
0.037

0.700
0.038

0.102
0.037

δ tR

3.078

0.018

2.901

0.018

δ tR−1

2.973

0.027

2.806

0.017

* The dependent variable is the log wage. The sample is limited to that of the main analysis as reported in the
text.

Decomposition of the Average Sectoral Wage Gap
The decomposition based on the W456 results is shown in Table 6. The main result is that the
average public sector wage premium is estimated to be close to zero (‐0.003) for men and positive
for women (0.113). Statistically, this estimate is significantly different from zero for women
(p=0.018) and not for men. 11
In the three alternate specifications, the estimates of the average public sector premium are all
positive for both sexes. For men, the other point estimates are 0.018, 0.117 and 0.120. For women
11

The results of the decomposition are a function of the estimated coefficients and the sample means. The

standard errors of the decomposition take account of the variance‐covariance matrix of the estimated
parameter vector. They also take account of the standard errors on the sample means. They also account for
the fact that the estimated mean time invariant characteristics of workers in each sector ( θ P and
functions of the estimated parameters and the sample means.
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θ R ) are

they are 0.113, 0.062 and 0.075 (Table 7). For both sexes, the confidence intervals of these estimates
all overlap. The four models are assumed to be equally valid and so the overall estimate is calculated
as the weighted average of the four. The weighting is inversely proportional to the variance of each
estimate. This maximises the precision of the overall estimate. The four pairs of estimates are
treated as independent, since they are each identified by different movements between sectors. 12
The overall estimate is thus 0.065 for men and 0.100 for women. These imply a public sector wage
premium of e0.065 – 1 = 6.7% for men and e0.100 – 1 = 10.5% for women. The estimates are statistically
significant (p=0.024 for and p<0.001 for women). The 95% confidence intervals are (0.009, 0.121) for
men and (0.058, 0.141) for women. These estimates do not change greatly if casual loadings are
allowed to vary between sectors (0.064 for men; 0.088 for women).

Table 6 Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gap from GMM results (Waves 4, 5 & 6)
Men
Estimate

SE

Women
Estimate

SE

Public Sector Wage Premium:
constant effect ( δ )
differences in returns to fixed characteristics
Total average wage premium

0.005
‐0.008
‐0.003

0.052
0.036
0.086

0.145
‐0.033
0.113

0.038
0.017
0.048

Effect of differences in characteristics:
casual status
fixed characteristics
Total effect of different characteristics

‐0.025
0.202
0.177

0.010
0.085
0.087

‐0.004
0.134
0.131

0.004
0.048
0.048

Unadjusted Wage Gap

0.174

0.243

Returning to Table 6, the largest components of the decomposition are due to sectoral differences in
the stock of time invariant skills (which include education, experience and unobserved
characteristics). For both sexes, this is a positive effect, suggesting that the average public sector
employee is more skilled than his or her private sector counterpart. This is consistent with Table 2,
which shows that they are more educated and more experienced.

12

Strictly speaking, the estimates are not independent. Across the four specifications and both sexes, the key

parameters of the models are identified by 330 employees who changed sector. Of these, 38 employees
changed sectors twice and hence contribute to the identification of two of the estimates. Nevertheless, the
assumption of independence should produce reasonable estimates for the standard errors.
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Table 7 Summary of estimated average public sector wage premiums across all GMM
models
Model
Waves 4, 5 & 6
Waves 3, 4 & 5
Waves 2, 3 & 4
Waves 1, 2 & 3
Overall estimate

Men
Estimate
‐0.003
0.018
0.117
0.120
0.065

SE
0.086
0.046
0.049
0.073
0.029

Women
estimate
0.113
0.062
0.075
0.118
0.100

SE
0.048
0.050
0.051
0.031
0.021

* The overall estimates are weighted arithmetic means of the estimates from the three models. The weights
are inversely proportional to the variance of the estimates, as described in the text.

VI Conclusion
This analysis suggests that the average Australian public sector employee is paid more than he or she
would be paid in the private sector. The best estimates of this public sector wage premium are 6.7%
for men and 10.5% for women. This does not include the value of benefits such as superannuation
and paid maternity leave which are also more generous in the public sector. This positive average
premium is consistent with most of the international literature on this topic. It may result from the
higher rates of unionisation in the public sector. It is also possible that this ‘premium’ compensates
public sector workers for unfavourable working environments. However, the evidence for Australia
suggests little or no sectoral difference in levels of work‐related stress or job satisfaction (Lewig and
Dollard, 2001; Macklin et al., 2006). The estimate is thus slightly higher for women than for men,
though their difference is not statistically significant. This is also consistent with most previous
research internationally.
The results also suggest that this premium results primarily from a constant effect across all
employees that is independent of skills. No evidence was found to suggest that the public sector
provides lower returns to skills, which would imply that it compresses the wage distribution of its
workers. This contrasts with studies that have addressed this issue for other countries, which
typically find that the public sector does compress the wage distribution (Gregory and Borland,
1999; Melly, 2006).
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Appendix: Detailed Results from Alternative Specifications
This Appendix presents the results of alternate specifications of the GMM model. In the body of the
text, the detailed results are shown for a model estimated on Waves 4, 5 and 6. This Appendix shows
the results of corresponding analyses on Waves 3, 4 and 5, on Waves 2, 3 and 4, and on Waves 1, 2
and 3, respectively. The main features of these results are discussed in the body of the text. The
results of the regression and the decomposition using Waves 3, 4 and 5 are shown in Table 8 and
Table 9. Corresponding results using Waves 2, 3 and 4 using Waves 1, 2 and 3 are shown in the
subsequent tables.

Table 8 GMM regression estimates of wage equations (Waves 3, 4, 5)
Men
coefficient

SE

Women
coefficient

SE

constant effect ( δ )

0.027

0.064

0.061

0.045

Returns to time invariant skills in public sector (ψ)
Casual

1.186
0.080

0.278
0.042

0.899
0.060

0.147
0.048

δ tR
δ tR−1

3.058

0.015

2.884

0.019

2.923

0.014

2.778

0.021

Table 9 Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gap from GMM results (Waves 3, 4, 5)
Men
Estimate

SE

Women
Estimate
SE

Public Sector Wage Premium:
constant effect ( δ )
differences in returns to fixed characteristics
Total average wage premium

0.027
‐0.010
0.018

0.064
0.020
0.046

0.061
0.001
0.062

0.045
0.005
0.050

Effect of differences in characteristics:
casual status
fixed characteristics
Total effect of different characteristics

‐0.006
‐0.060
‐0.066

0.006
0.046
0.047

‐0.015
0.018
0.003

0.012
0.052
0.050

Unadjusted Wage Gap

‐0.048

23

0.065

Table 10 GMM regression estimates of wage equations (Waves 2, 3, 4)
Men
coefficient

SE

Women
coefficient

SE

constant effect ( δ )

0.114

0.056

0.110

0.032

Returns to time invariant skills in public sector (ψ)
Casual

1.069
0.029

0.194
0.040

0.702
0.111

0.188
0.061

δ tR
δ tR−1

2.876

0.023

2.820

0.022

2.793

0.013

2.776

0.029

Table 11 Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gap from GMM results (Waves 2, 3, 4)
Men
Estimate
Public Sector Wage Premium:
constant effect ( δ )
differences in returns to fixed characteristics
Total average wage premium
Effect of differences in characteristics:
casual status
fixed characteristics
Total effect of different characteristics
Unadjusted Wage Gap

SE

Women
Estimate
SE

0.114
0.003
0.117

0.056
0.011
0.049

0.110
‐0.035
0.075

0.032
0.031
0.051

‐0.003
0.049
0.047

0.004
0.049
0.050

‐0.020
0.152
0.132

0.014
0.051
0.052

0.164

0.207

Table 12 GMM regression estimates of wage equations (Waves 1, 2, 3)
Men
coefficient

SE

Women
coefficient

SE

constant effect ( δ )

0.121

0.069

0.039

0.086

Returns to time invariant skills in public sector (ψ)
Casual

0.975
0.170

0.327
0.046

1.777
0.015

0.851
0.041

δ tR

2.863

0.020

2.797

0.017

δ

2.789

0.026

2.695

0.020

R
t −1
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Table 13 Decomposition of Sectoral Wage Gap from GMM results (Waves 1, 2, 3)
Men
Estimate

SE

Women
Estimate
SE

Public Sector Wage Premium:
constant effect ( δ )
differences in returns to fixed characteristics
Total average wage premium

0.121
‐0.002
0.120

0.069
0.021
0.073

0.039
0.079
0.118

0.086
0.082
0.031

Effect of differences in characteristics:
casual status
fixed characteristics
Total effect of different characteristics

0.045
‐0.027
‐0.002

0.074
0.011
0.025

0.119
‐0.003
0.079

0.031
0.009
0.082

Unadjusted Wage Gap

0.118

0.197
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